After Crimea: Disarmament, Frozen Conflicts, And Illicit Trafficking Through Eastern Europe by Gheorge, Eliza
  
 
 
Mario Einaudi 
Center for 
International 
Studies 
 
 
 
 
After Crimea:  
Disarmament, Frozen 
Conflicts, And Illicit 
Trafficking Through  
Eastern Europe 
 
 
Eliza Gheorghe, Cornell University 
July 2015 
 
M a r i o  E i n a u d i  C e n t e r  f o r  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  S t u d i e s  •  
w w w . e i n a u d i . c o r n e l l . e d u  
1 7 0  U r i s  H a l l ,  C o r n e l l  U n i v e r s i t y ,  I t h a c a  N Y  1 4 8 5 3 ,  t .  6 0 7 - 2 5 5 - 6 3 7 0 ,  f . 6 0 7 - 4 - 5 0 0 0  
No.4-15 
W
or
ki
ng
 P
ap
er
 S
er
ie
s 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To view past working papers and guidelines for submission, please visit the Mario Einaudi 
Center for International Studies Working Paper Series webpage at: 
http://einaudi.cornell.edu/working-paper-series.  
For more information please contact Dr. Heike Michelsen, 170 Uris Hall, Tel: 607.255.8926, 
hm75@cornell.edu. 
 
AFTER CRIMEA: DISARMAMENT, FROZEN CONFLICTS, AND ILLICIT 
TRAFFICKING THROUGH EASTERN EUROPE 
Eliza Gheorghe, Cornell University 
Paper Presented at the Workshop “A Stable Transition to a New Nuclear Order” 
Berlin, December 15-16, 2014 
Abstract 
This paper examines the principal-agent problem in the case of Russia and breakaway republics in its 
near abroad, with a specific focus on nuclear smuggling. These spaces have been a haven for nuclear 
traffickers, posing important challenges for international efforts aimed at stemming proliferation. 
Given that secessionist regimes in this area owe their existence to Moscow’s military presence, 
scholars have blamed Russia for nuclear smuggling incidents in frozen conflict areas, arguing that 
Moscow has never been cooperative on nuclear matters. However, the historical record reveals that 
Russia does not take the dangers posed by nuclear smuggling lightly, as insurgent groups in the region 
have repeatedly threatened to use dirty bombs against it. A closer look at both the theory and the 
empirical evidence around the illicit trade with nuclear materials, drawing on examples of nuclear 
trafficking through Transnistria, shows that it is the state of lawlessness in these breakaway republics 
that makes these territories a fertile ground for smuggling networks. As organized crime engulfs these 
quasi-states, professional traffickers take over smuggling rings from amateurs. This paper shows that 
the increasing frequency of nuclear smuggling incidents in breakaway republics is better explained by 
the growing sophistication of trafficking networks rather than by Russia’s involvement in these frozen 
conflict zones.  
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AFTER CRIMEA: DISARMAMENT, FROZEN CONFLICTS, AND ILLICIT TRAFFICKING 
THROUGH EASTERN EUROPE 
Eliza Gheorghe, Cornell University 
In May 2014, the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) apprehended nine people attempting to 
smuggle 1.5 kg of U235 from Transnistria, a self-proclaimed republic that broke away from 
Moldova in 1991, to Eastern Ukraine. Eight of the traffickers were Ukrainian citizens, with 
ties to the separatist forces in the Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts (the Donbass region), leading 
the Ukrainian authorities to posit that the captured materials could have been used in a dirty 
bomb, meant to destabilize the social and political situation in the country.1 One week after 
the arrests, Luhansk and Donetsk declared their independence. With Russia’s support, the 
separatists have been fighting the Ukrainian armed forces since April 2014, leaving behind 
over 6,000 people dead and forcing over one million Ukrainians out of their homes. Russia 
apparently seeks to create a “frozen conflict” in Ukraine to maintain leverage over Kyiv and 
to prevent the expansion of Western influence.2 The May 2014 nuclear smuggling incident 
spiked suspicions that Moscow is turning a blind eye to nuclear trafficking to advance its 
revisionist geopolitical agenda. This view echoes the criticism that Russia “has never been 
cooperative on nuclear matters.”3 
Undeniably, the gap between the United States and Russia on nonproliferation has increased 
in recent years. Despite Moscow’s efforts to bring Iran to the negotiating table, U.S.-Russian 
cooperation on nuclear nonproliferation has reached an all-time low. The 2008 War in 
Georgia, missile defense in Eastern Europe, and Russia’s involvement in the Ukraine crisis 
have led to greater and greater mutual suspicion and estrangement. Ratcheting up the pressure 
on Moscow and isolating it have been deemed necessary to reassure threatened Eastern 
European countries and prevent them from going nuclear.4 However, marginalizing Russia is 
likely to backfire, especially in the field of nuclear trafficking. Recent studies have shown 
how criminal networks might be used as deliberate tools by states pursuing nuclear 
proliferation.5 However, this is not Russia’s case. The Russian government has as much of an 
interest in stemming and preventing nuclear smuggling as the West does.6 Non-state actors 
equipped with dirty bombs, operating in such a volatile region, would be too close for 
                                                          
1 V Ukrayinu vvzely radioaktyvnu rechovynu dlya stvorennya ‘brudnoyi’ bomby – SBU, TSN, May 5, 2014, 
available at: http://tsn.ua/politika/v-ukrayinu-vvezli-radioaktivnu-rechovinu-dlya-stvorennya-brudnoyi-bombi-
sbu-348159.html. 
2 Pavel Felgenhauer, “Rossii nuzhna ‘zamorozka’ konflikta,” Novaya Gazeta, No. 67 (June 23, 2014), available 
at: http://www.novayagazeta.ru/politics/64119.html; Balázs Jarábik, “Zamorozhennyi konflikt v Donbasse?,” 
Eurasia Outlook, Carnegie Center Moscow, November 17, 2014, available at: 
http://carnegie.ru/publications/?fa=57293. 
3 Gustav Gressel, “Russia and Non-proliferation: A Concession that Never Was,” European Council on Foreign 
Affairs, November 25, 2014, available at: 
http://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_russia_and_non_proliferation_a_concession_that_never_was361. 
4 James Goldgeier, “The U.S. Must Isolate Russia for the Sake of Nuclear Nonproliferation,” The New Republic, 
March 2, 2014, available at: http://www.newrepublic.com/article/116826/us-must-isolate-russia-sake-nuclear-
nonproliferation. 
5 Sheena Chestnut, “Illicit Activity and Proliferation: North Korean Smuggling Networks,” International 
Security, Vol. 32, No. 1 (Summer 2007), 82. 
6 William C. Potter, “Prospects for U.S.-Russian Cooperation in Nuclear Proliferation in a Time of Cold Peace,” 
Security Index, Vol. 15, No. 2 (87), 92, 94. 
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comfort for the Kremlin. The historical record suggests that Russia is more likely to be a 
partner rather than an antagonist in stemming the illicit trade with nuclear and radiological 
materials. While the May 2014 nuclear smuggling incident raises questions about Moscow’s 
control over its proxies in Eastern Ukraine, the scarcity of empirical data on the relationship 
between the separatists in Donbass and the Kremlin prevents a thorough examination of the 
principal-agent problem posed by nuclear smuggling in Eastern Ukraine. However, important 
insights emerge from the study of a comparable case – Transnistria. 
In the early 1990s, the separatists in Transnistria used nuclear smuggling to destabilize the 
government in Chișinău and secede from Moldova, without much opposition from Russia. It 
was thanks to Moscow’s support that Transnistria proclaimed its independence. Despite 
Russia’s tough stance on non-proliferation, Transnistria remains vulnerable to nuclear 
trafficking. The international community refuses to recognize Tiraspol, for fear that a revision 
of the frontier lines in Russia’s near abroad would lead to further instability. Yet fixed 
borders make conflict more likely.7 The closed circuit space that constitutes Transnistria 
amounts to little more than a failed state: it suffers from lawlessness, systemic corruption, and 
rampant poverty. Because Moscow has tapered off, delayed, and, in some cases, stopped 
altogether its financial assistance for Transnistria, Tiraspol is facing bankruptcy.8 These 
conditions create a fertile ground for organized crime and smuggling networks, a 
phenomenon that can be observed not only in Transnistria but in other breakaway republics. 
With Moscow’s control over the separatists diminishing, the likelihood of nuclear smuggling 
in Russia’s near abroad increases. The recent up-tick in nuclear trafficking has caused 
significant unease in Washington, leading to a heavier American involvement in the post-
Soviet space. 
To analyze the relationship between smuggling networks and quasi-states such as 
Transnistria, I will first analyze U.S.-Russian cooperation on non-proliferation. This section 
will shed light on Moscow’s contribution to the campaign to stem nuclear smuggling. Then I 
will examine the theoretical debate about the impact of state support on the effectiveness of 
trafficking networks. Subsequently, I will look at recent incidents involving nuclear materials 
smuggling in Transnistria. Lastly, I will review the counter-smuggling infrastructure set in 
place by the United States in cooperation with these states and offer policy recommendations 
that address actual and potential threats posed by the situation in Eastern Ukraine. The 
argument of this paper is that the internal and external circumstances for quasi-states explain 
the variation in how nuclear smuggling occurs in and through these territories. I identify a 
cycle of smuggling through breakaway republics: the state of lawlessness in these territories 
enables amateurs to traffic materials; then, as the quasi-states fall prey to organized crime, 
professional traffickers take over smuggling chains. The more sophisticated smuggling 
networks become, the harder it is to stem the illicit trade with radiological and nuclear 
materials (abbreviated as RN materials). 
                                                          
7 Boaz Atzili, “When Good Fences Make Bad Neighbours. Fixed Borders, State Weakness, and International 
Conflict,” International Security, Vol. 31, No. 3 (Winter 2006/2007), 139. 
8 Iulian Chifu, “Transnistria în faliment: salariile bugetarilor întârziate luni de zile la rând,” Evenimentul Zilei, 
June 3, 2015, available at: http://www.evz.ro/pulsul-planetei-transnistria-in-faliment-salariile-bugetarilor-
intarziate-luni-de-zile-la-rand.html. 
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Background 
In the aftermath of 9/11, the George W. Bush administration adopted an alarmist approach to 
nuclear smuggling, framing the combination of WMDs, rogue states, and terrorist groups as 
Washington’s worst nightmare. The fear of terrorist groups getting their hands on a nuclear 
bomb drove much of U.S. plans for the development and deployment of advanced 
conventional weapons. As Dennis Gormley has pointed out, the build-up in conventional 
capabilities made Russia feel increasingly uncomfortable.9 In parallel, Moldova, Ukraine, and 
Georgia strengthened their ties to the European Union by signing association agreements, a 
move strongly opposed by Russia. Moreover, the United States enlarged its intelligence 
footprint in the region, in an effort to combat nuclear trafficking. Washington boosted the 
budgets of intelligence agencies and of the myriad of initiatives undertaken by the 
Department of Defense to curtail smuggling with nuclear and radiological materials. U.S.-
Russian intelligence liaison on nuclear trafficking represents a long-held desideratum.10 Yet 
relations between American intelligence agencies and their Russian counterparts remain 
fraught, as Moscow feels threatened by this growing number of U.S. spies in its backyard.11 
As John Mearsheimer writes, “great powers are always sensitive to potential threats near their 
home territory.”12  
Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the ongoing fighting in Luhansk and Donetsk have also 
severely strained relations between Moscow and Washington. Policy makers and analysts talk 
of a “new Cold War,” a phase which, unlike the 2008 crisis following the Russian-Georgian 
war, leaves little hope for a speedy return to “business as usual.”13 As a result of the 
deteriorating relations with the West, Moscow has found itself cut off or left out from certain 
frameworks and operations that have a direct impact on its security. In April 2014, the United 
States announced the termination of funding for programs under the aegis of the Nunn-Lugar 
Cooperative Threat Reduction program, whose main aim is to secure and dismantle nuclear 
stockpiles and boost physical safety at Russian nuclear facilities.14 The cuts are meant to 
                                                          
9 Dennis Gormley, “American Conventional Superiority: The Balancing Act,” in Catherine McArdle Kelleher 
and Judith Reppy (eds.), Getting to Zero: The Path to Nuclear Disarmament (Stanford, CA: Stanford University 
Press, 2011), 317. 
10 Steven Aoki, “International Cooperation to Combat Illicit Nuclear Trafficking,” Paper presented at a 
workshop at Stanford University entitled A Comparative Analysis of Approaches to the Protection of Fissile 
Materials, July 30, 1997, available at: http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/international-cooperation-combat-
illicit-nuclear-trafficking; Rensselaer W. Lee III, “Toward an Intelligence-based Nuclear Cooperation Regime,” 
Foreign Policy Research Institute, July 2009, available at: http://www.fpri.org/articles/2009/07/toward-
intelligence-based-nuclear-cooperation-regime; Matthew Bunn and Yuri Morozov, Rolf Mowatt-Larrsen, Simon 
Saradzhyan, William Tobey, Viktor I. Yesin, and Pavel S. Zolotarev, The U.S.-Russia Joint Threat Assessment 
of Nuclear Terrorism. Cambridge, Mass.: Report for Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, 
Harvard Kennedy School, Institute for U.S. and Canadian Studies, June 6, 2011, 48. 
11 Oleg Bukharin, “The FSB and the U.S.-Russian Nuclear Security Partnership,” The Nonproliferation Review, 
Vol. 10, No. 1 (Spring 2003), 140. 
12 John J. Mearsheimer, “Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West’s Fault. The Liberal Delusions that Provoked 
Putin,” in Foreign Affairs, Vol. 93, No. 5 (September/October 2014), 5-6.  
13 Robert Legvold, “Managing the New Cold War. What Moscow and Washington Can Learn from the Last 
One,” Foreign Affairs, July/August 2014, available at: http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/141537/robert-
legvold/managing-the-new-cold-war. 
14 SShA prekrashchayut finansirovanie rabot po yadernoy bezopasnosti v Rossii, Interfax, April 8, 2014, 
available at: http://www.interfax.ru/world/370087. 
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punish Russia for its annexation of Crimea and its support for the separatists in Donbass.15 In 
addition, by December 2014, Ukraine replaced Russia as the top beneficiary of NATO’s 
Science for Peace and Security (SPS) program, which deals with contraband with nuclear 
materials and ACW technologies among other issues.16 Cooperation with Russia under the 
aegis of SPS has been suspended until further notice. 
The authorities in Moscow have vowed to secure nuclear materials and sensitive technologies 
by themselves. Russia does not take lightly the danger posed by smuggling in nuclear or 
advanced conventional weapons (ACW) technologies, stressing its commitment to fight 
against trafficking both in its national programmatic documents and in its contribution to 
international fora.17 Moscow has good reasons to fear nuclear terrorism: insurgent groups 
fighting around the Black Sea have repeatedly threatened to use this deadly combination 
against it.18 As some experts have pointed out, isolating Moscow is likely to hurt 
Washington’s efforts to combat trafficking with nuclear materials and ACW technologies in 
Eastern Europe.19 The historic record suggests that past U.S.-Russian joint effort to fight 
nuclear smuggling were successful. In recent years, as Washington and Moscow have grown 
apart, there appears to be an up-tick in the number of nuclear trafficking incidents. 
More specifically, the Incident and Trafficking Database (ITDB) compiled by the IAEA 
reports a sharp decline in the number of incidents involving unauthorized possession, theft or 
loss of radioactive sources and nuclear materials over the twenty-year period it has recorded 
so far (from 1993 until 2013). The ITDB logs two broad categories of events: the illegal 
possession and movement of RN materials, attempted sale, purchase or use of such materials 
for illegal purposes and the theft or loss of nuclear materials or radioactive sources from 
facilities or during transport.20 The 2477 confirmed incidents that took place between 1993 
and 2013 can be classified as follows: 424 incidents of unauthorized possession and related 
criminal activities, 664 incidents of theft or loss of RN materials, 1337 incidents involving 
other unauthorized activities and events (such as the unauthorized disposal, unauthorized 
shipment, or the discovery of RN materials) and 69 inconclusive cases.  
                                                          
15 U amerikanskykh sanktsii povysilas’ radioaktivnosti, Kommersant, April 8, 2014, available at: 
http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2447647. 
16 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Boosting Scientific Cooperation with Ukraine, December 2, 2014, 
available at: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_115418.htm. 
17 Sovet Bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsii, Strategiya natsional’noy bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsii do 
2020 goda, §37, Utverzhdena Ukazom Prezidenta Rossiyskoy Federatsii, ot 12 maya, 2009, available at: 
http://www.scrf.gov.ru/documents/99.html; Memorandum Rossiyskoy Federatsii na Sammite po fizicheskoy 
yadernoy bezopasnosti v 2012 godu, Ministerstvo Inostrannyikh Del Rossiyskoy Federatsii, available at 
http://www.mid.ru/bdomp/ns-
dvbr.nsf/71ff2dbff09d113b43256a65002aa93b/c32577ca00173dc0442579cb00285262!OpenDocument. 
18 Lyudmila Zaitseva, “Nuclear Trafficking in Ungoverned Spaces and Failed States,” in Anne L. Clunan and 
Harold A. Trinkunas (eds.), Ungoverned Spaces. Alternatives to State Authority in an Era of Softened 
Sovereignty (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2010), 195-201. 
19 Siegfried S. Hecker, “For U.S. and Russia, Isolation Can Lead to Nuclear Catastrophe,” The New York Times, 
November 18, 2014, available at: http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2014/11/14/standing-up-to-
aggression-or-ensuring-nuclear-security/for-us-and-russia-isolation-can-lead-to-nuclear-catastrophe. 
20 International Atomic Energy Agency, Incident and Trafficking Database (ITDB) Fact Sheet, http://www-
ns.iaea.org/downloads/security/itdb-fact-sheet.pdf. 
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As Figure 1 shows, incidents involving unauthorized possession and related criminal 
activities peaked in 1994, decreasing in frequency between 1996 and 2003, when they picked 
up again in the mid-2000s. 
 
 
Figure 1 Incidents Reported to the Incident and Trafficking Database (ITDB) involving 
unauthorized possession and related criminal activities, 1993-2013. Source: 
International Atomic Energy Agency 
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Figure 2 Incidents reported to the ITDB involving theft or loss, 1993-2013. Source: 
International Atomic Energy Agency 
The number of incidents involving the theft or loss of radioactive sources reached an all-time 
high in 2006 (over 135) and then dropped dramatically to under 40 in 2013 (See Figure 2). 
Most of the credit for this decrease in stolen or lost radioactive sources went to the United 
States, since Washington bankrolled the efforts to store, protect, and detect RN materials. 
However, Russia also contributed to this success by sharing sensitive information, granting 
access to its facilities, and allowing the installation of monitoring sensors. Some U.S. 
officials downplayed Moscow’s responsiveness, complaining about the Cold War mentality 
that some Russian representatives still displayed.21 This reading of Russia’s (sometimes 
legitimate) distrust led to the mistaken conclusion that the United States can do it alone. 
Since 2011 the number of incidents has risen again, a trend which could worsen given the 
growing divergence between the United States and Russia. The termination of funding 
through CTR is particularly problematic since its main aim was securing RN materials. 
Despite Russia’s pledge to continue these efforts on its own, the gap between its intentions 
and its abilities remains a source of concern. 
In the early 1990s, the number of unauthorized possession incidents dwarfs the frequency of 
thefts and losses. The discrepancy between unauthorized possession and theft may seem 
striking, since the two categories overlap. It is impossible to log an event as unauthorized 
possession without also recording it as theft. This discordance may stem from the tendency of 
                                                          
21 Jack Caravelli, “U.S.-Russia Nuclear Cooperation Drawing to a Close,” The Washington Free Beacon, 
November 17, 2014, available at: http://freebeacon.com/national-security/u-s-russia-nuclear-cooperation-
drawing-to-a-close. 
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bureaucracies to downplay dangerous incidents so as to avoid penalties. Another explanation 
involves the timeline covered by the ITDB: the database was created only in 1995, so the data 
collected for 1993 and 1994 might have been amalgamated into one big category 
(unauthorized possession) instead of two. 
The sensors deployed by the United States, primarily on the borders of the former Soviet 
Union, as part of its various efforts to stem nuclear trafficking, such as the Global Threat 
Reduction Initiative, the Proliferation Security Initiative, and the Container Security 
Initiative, could account for the up-tick in reported incidents in the mid-2000s. With more 
equipment to detect smuggling, the number of reported incidents also rises. However, the 
War on Terror and the resumption or dismantlement of nuclear programs in various countries, 
such as Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Iran, or Syria may better explain both the availability of RN 
materials and the interest of non-state actors in selling or buying HEU, Plutonium, or 
radioactive sources for a Radiological Dispersion Device (RDD) or a Weapon of Mass 
Destruction (WMD). 
Many of these incidents occurred in Eastern Europe, prompting the United States to target its 
assistance to vulnerable countries, such as Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova, and Romania. 
Nonproliferation assistance to former Soviet states, enhanced law enforcement, customs, and 
border controls, together with intensified intelligence liaison with various international 
partners seem to have worked. The decline in the number of incidents involving nuclear 
materials trafficking after 2006 casts U.S. countersmuggling efforts in a positive light. Yet 
absence of evidence does not constitute evidence of absence. The problem with smuggling 
networks resides in their clandestine nature and their ability to avoid detection. The sharp 
decline in the number of incidents may be explained by a switch from the “amateurish 
‘visible’ nuclear black market to a more sophisticated ‘invisible’ nuclear black market.”22 
The intensification of U.S. presence in this part of the world irked the Russians, who found 
themselves without much of a say over intrusive, complex operations carried out by the FBI 
and the CIA. Tensions with Moscow could not have come at a worse moment: the conflict in 
Eastern Ukraine spawned a whole host of complications, from the proliferation of advanced 
conventional weapons in the hands of insurgents in Luhansk and Donetsk, to the weakening 
of border controls in Eastern Ukraine, and to overall instability in a country that has the 
largest number of nuclear facilities in Eastern Europe (other than Russia). In the absence of a 
constructive relationship with Russia and as smuggling networks are becoming more 
complex, Washington’s efforts to prevent the acquisition, proliferation and use of WMDs and 
ACWs by terrorist networks are likely to run aground. 
  
                                                          
22 William C. Potter and Elena Sokova, “Illicit Nuclear Trafficking in the NIS: What’s New? What’s True?” The 
Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 9, No. 2 (Summer 2002), 112. 
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Frozen Conflicts and Nuclear Trafficking 
The evolution of nuclear smuggling networks represents the main puzzle for recent studies 
looking at trafficking with nuclear materials and sensitive technologies. The question this 
scholarship tries to answer is: Why are some trafficking networks successful in smuggling 
nuclear materials and sensitive technologies, while others face disruptions, malfunctions, or 
outright dismantlement? 
Scholars have looked to two broad explanations of network effectiveness: internal 
configuration and external support. With respect to internal configuration or structure, 
Alexander H. Montgomery argues that the way in which the nodes of a network are 
connected determines its effectiveness. He puts forward three configurations for nuclear 
trafficking networks: rings (or circles); stars; and cliques, arguing that the most vulnerable 
structures are stars and cliques, which can be dismantled by targeting the hub.23 External 
support can come from two sources: governments and the private sector. Justin V. Hastings 
proposes that the external environment, more precisely state support, enables a nuclear 
smuggling network to successfully carry out its operations. The research done by Louise 
Shelley, John Picarelli, and Chris Corpora suggests that partnering up with private businesses 
allows nuclear smuggling networks to thrive.24 At first glance, these two schools of thought 
appear mutually exclusive. The empirical evidence, however, suggests the need to merge 
them. The literature on nuclear trafficking in breakaway republics such as Transnistria, 
Ossetia, Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Donetsk and Luhansk shows that the external 
support that smuggling networks receive affects their internal configuration and vice-versa.25 
How do quasi-states help smuggling networks? To answer this question, trafficking networks 
need first to be disaggregated. Smuggling involves three types of actors: suppliers, 
coordinators, and buyers. An organization that produces the nuclear material or ACW to be 
trafficked represents a supplier. The recipient country or non-state actor is the buyer. 
Coordinators are defined in the literature as “one or more people or organizations who either 
contract for goods from the suppliers or simply steal them, and then arrange to have [the 
goods] transported to the buyer.”26 The focus of this paper is primarily on coordinators. The 
argument I put forward is two-fold, addressing both the internal structure of smuggling 
networks and the external environment in which they operate. I argue that the quasi-states 
                                                          
23 Alexander H. Montgomery, “Ringing in Proliferation: How to Dismantle an Atomic Bomb Network,” 
International Security, Vol. 30, No. 2 (Fall 2005), 153-187; Alexander H. Montgomery, “Proliferation Networks 
in Theory and Practice,” in James A. Russell and James J. Wirtz (eds.), Globalization and WMD Proliferation. 
Terrorism, transnational networks, and international security (London and New York: Routledge, 2008), 28-39. 
24 Louise Shelley, John Picarelli, and Chris Corpora, “Global Crime Inc.,” in Maryann Cusmano (ed.), Beyond 
Sovereignty: Issues for a Global Agenda: Second Edition (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing, 2003), 143-
166. 
25 Alexander Kupatadze, “Organized Crime and the Trafficking of Radiological Materials,” The 
Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 17, No. 2 (July 2010), 219-234; William C. Potter and Elena Sokova, “Illicit 
Nuclear Trafficking in the NIS: What’s New? What’s True?,” The Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 9, No. 2 
(Summer 2002), 112-120; Lyudmila Zaitseva and Friedrich Steinhäusler, Nuclear Trafficking Issues in the Black 
Sea Region, in EU Non-Proliferation Consortium, Non-Proliferation Papers, No. 39, April 2014, 1-23. 
26 Justin V. Hastings, “Consequences of the Nuclear Renaissance for Nonstate Nuclear Trafficking,” in Adam 
M. Stulberg and Matthew Fuhrmann (eds.), The Nuclear Renaissance and International Security (Stanford, 
Stanford University Press, 2013), 225. 
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emerging after the dissolution of the USSR created the ideal conditions for coordinators to 
thrive. Functionally and structurally, these smuggling networks differ from well-known 
proliferation rings in that they rely primarily on conventional contraband for their profits, 
treating nuclear trafficking as a side-activity. The extensive drug, human, and arms 
trafficking they carry out provides them with the expertise and resources of professional 
smugglers, but they display an opportunistic approach so far as nuclear trafficking is 
concerned. 
Two characteristics set these breakaway states in the post-Soviet space apart from other types 
of external supporters of smuggling networks: their legal status and their socio-economic 
inheritance. First, the international community does not recognize these breakaway republics, 
which puts them in a convenient state of limbo. The countries from which these territories 
have tried to secede treat them as autonomous territorial units with special legal status. 
Intergovernmental organizations, such as the United Nations, lack leverage vis-à-vis these 
separatist regions, since the quasi-states do not participate in any inter-governmental 
framework. The international community isolated them from the moment they declared their 
independence in the 1990s. They share a common supporter – the Russian Federation. As 
Montgomery points out, preventing actors of concern from connecting with the rest of the 
world will compel them to connect with each other instead.27 His argument stems from a core 
neo-liberal argument that assimilation into the global economy dampens proliferation.28 His 
hypothesis is corroborated by the situation in Eastern Europe and the Black Sea region, where 
secessionist republics maintain friendly relations with one another, under the aegis of the 
Community for Democracy and Rights of Nations.29 
Second, breakaway states inherited a variety of facilities that make them particularly 
attractive for smuggling networks. They host industrial facilities and military bases 
containing RN materials; moreover, they were left with significant caches of weapons and 
ammunitions. Nuclear trafficking is difficult and costly. By comparison, other forms of the 
shadow trade, for example arms smuggling, suffer less from this shortcoming, because they 
leave a less detectable signature. The illicit trade with ACW technologies unfolds at a much 
larger scale than the contraband with nuclear materials, generating much larger profits than 
nuclear smuggling. Depending on how lucrative the contraband trade with ACW is, 
traffickers may invest in infrastructure: buying their own aircraft or boats, building their own 
landing strips or docks, and recruiting their own security forces. This simplified yet secured 
infrastructure can then be used for nuclear trafficking. Through vertical integration with 
professional traffickers nuclear smugglers can withdraw from open and public commercial 
networks, and so they have less contact with the authorities. Reducing the number of 
chokepoints and a network’s footprint also decreases the chances that law enforcement 
                                                          
27 Alexander H. Montgomery, “Ringing in Proliferation: How to Dismantle an Atomic Bomb Network,” 
International Security, Vol. 30, No. 2 (Fall 2005), 181. 
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Rossiyey i Yevropoy,” Politicheskii Zhurnal’, Vol. 4, No. 7 (February 9, 2004), available at: 
http://www.politjournal.ru/index.php?action=Articles&dirid=40&tek=549&issue=16. 
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agencies will detect and disrupt the operation. The infrequent involvement in nuclear 
trafficking means that each time the transaction will take a different form, making it difficult 
for law enforcement agencies to detect patterns of standard operating procedures. This 
polymorphism derives from the wide-ranging experience acquired in other black markets. 
This section has argued that smuggling networks in Eastern Europe differ from dedicated 
proliferation rings because of the peculiar external environment in which they operate and 
their structural properties. The quasi-state entities emerging in the aftermath of the 
dissolution of the USSR provide a safe haven for smuggling network coordinators. They 
engage in a wide variety of illicit activities, primarily drug, human, and weapons trafficking, 
and have only a narrow interest in selling nuclear materials to terrorist groups. 
Transnistria: A Smuggler’s Paradise 
The Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic (PMR), commonly referred to as Transnistria, is a 
breakaway republic wedged between the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine (see Figure 3). 
This sliver of land follows the course of the Nistru River, and covers 4,000 sq km. Its 
population – more than half a million people – speaks Russian, Moldovan, and Ukrainian. 
Transnistria has its own capital – Tiraspol – its own currency – the Transnistrian rouble–, its 
own Parliament and Constitution, as well as its own flag and anthem. The Moldovan 
authorities do not have administrative control over the railway crossing points between 
Transnistria and Ukraine, such as the one between Pervomaisc and Kuchurhan (see Figure 
4).30 A railway connection links Ungheni (passing through Chișinău) to Tiraspol and then to 
Odessa (in Ukraine). Railway traffic between Chișinău and Tiraspol is occasionally closed 
because of political tensions between Moldova and Transnistria.31 
                                                          
30 Interview with Moldovan think tank researcher, Chișinău, Republic of Moldova, February 28, 2013. 
31 Idem. 
Figure 3: Moldova and Transnistria; Source:  
The Financial Times 
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Figure 4: Transportation routes in Transnistria. Source: www.WorldMapFinder.com 
The conflict between the Republic of Moldova and Transnistria began in 1990, when Tiraspol 
declared its independence from Chișinău, fearing a scenario in which Moldova and Romania 
reunited. During the Soviet era, Transnistria was the most economically developed part of 
Moldova, concentrating almost 90% of electricity production and one third of the Moldovan  
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heavy industry.32 This industrial base provided Tiraspol not only with a source of income 
after it had declared independence but also with a fount of radioactive sources, used in 
metallurgical plants, agricultural complexes, and research institutes. 
The secessionist forces in the self-proclaimed republic quickly became aware of the leverage 
they could gain vis-à-vis Chișinău from the combination of conventional weapons and 
radioactive sources or nuclear materials. On March 1992, in the midst of the 1992 
Transnistria War, a box of radioactive material was stolen from a facility located on PMR’s 
territory that was under the supervision of Russian forces. The thieves threatened to blow up 
the materials if a cease-fire was not reached.33 A few months later, in May 1992, short-range 
Alazan rockets tipped with radioactive materials were delivered by Transnistrian separatists 
to Gagauz militants in Southern Moldova. On this occasion, two Moldovan policemen were 
killed while trying to stop the transfer.34 The weapons provided by the Transnistrian 
secessionists were meant to destabilize the Republic of Moldova, and topple its regime. 
Alazan rockets were initially designed by Soviet scientists for weather control purposes, more 
exactly to prevent hail. The rocket was then converted for military use, and it was deployed in 
conflict zones from Nagorno-Karabakh to Chechnya.35 According to Oazu Nantoi — a 
former Moldovan government official and political analyst, who acquired a batch of 
Transnistrian documents dated 1994 — the 14th Army had 38 radioactive warheads for 
Alazan rockets in storage near a military airport in Transnistria which later went missing. The 
Alazan rockets story subsided for a few years until May 2005, when the London Times 
revealed through a sting operation that three short-range Alazan rockets tipped with 
radioactive warheads were offered for sale at a price of $500,000 for all three by an arms 
dealer in Bender (Tighina) in Transnistria. The Times reporter posed as a representative of an 
Algerian militant group.36 The radioactive materials, according to the arms dealer, were Sr90 
and Cs137. The actual rockets were neither seen by the journalist nor examined with a 
radiation detector, to certify that they were indeed tipped with radioactive materials. Soon 
after, the Moldovan general prosecutor opened a criminal case to investigate the claims made 
in the Times report. The general prosecutor’s office did not make the outcome of 
investigation public. 
  
                                                          
32 Vladimir Kolosov and Dmitrii Zayats, “Moldova i Pridnestrovye: natsionalnoe stroitelstvo, territorialnye 
identichnosti, perspektivy razresheniya konflikta,” Vestnik Evrazii, Vol. 1 (2001), 97. 
33 Alex P. Schmidt and Charlotte Spencer-Smith, “Illicit Radiological and Nuclear Trafficking, Smuggling and 
Security Incidents in the Black Sea Region since the fall of the Iron Curtain – An Open Source Inventory,” 
Perspectives on Terrorism, Vol.6, No. 2 (2012), 120. 
34 Thomas Orszag-Land, “Islamic Terrorists Look to Moldova for Dirty Bombs,” Contemporary Review, Vol. 
284, No. 1659 (April 2004), 222. 
35 Radioactive Rockets ‘For Sale’ in Breakaway Soviet Republic, Nuclear Threat Initiative, May 8, 2005, 
available at: http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/dirty-bomb-rocket-again-reported-sale-transnistria/. 
36 Radioactive Rockets 'For Sale' in Breakaway Soviet Republic, Brian Johnson Thomas and Mark Franchetti, 
The Times, May 8 2005, available at: http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/news/uk/article1932790.ece. 
Alina Radu, “Tiraspolul vinde rachete,” Ziarul de Gardă, May 12 2005, available at: 
http://www.zdg.md/39/investigatii/. 
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These incidents show why traffickers and international criminal organizations find 
Transnistria so appealing. First, the special status enjoyed by the PMR makes Tiraspol 
impervious to international legal instruments. The authorities in Tiraspol cannot be brought 
before an international court because doing so would amount to the de jure recognition of the 
PMR. The lack of effective prosecution for the rocket dealings signaled that the Transnistrian 
authorities would not suffer at the hands of the international community if it functioned as a 
safe haven for transnational criminal organizations (TCOs). Because the international 
community had already isolated Tiraspol, it had few ways to bring additional pressure. 
This brings us to a second feature, homophily, in other words the tendency for actors that 
share certain attributes to form ties. Transnistria offered assistance to Găgăuzia, an 
autonomous territorial unit in southern Moldova, to advance their common fight against 
Chișinău. Being cut off from the international arena only pushes Transnistria closer to other 
breakaway states, such as Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia. With the 
exception of Russia and a handful other countries – Venezuela, Nicaragua, and Nauru – the 
only recognition these breakaway republics receive comes from each other.37 The close ties 
between these de facto states can also be explained through their common Soviet legacy. 
Moreover, because of the connection between the leaders of these breakaway republics and 
the underworld, they are regarded as “mafia-states.” Revenues from organized crime in 
Transnistria, for example, amount to $3-4 billion/year, from which the leadership in Tiraspol 
takes the lion’s share.38 These resources do not trickle down to the general population, whose 
monthly income averages below $100. In the absence of international legitimate partners, the 
secessionist republics remain caught in the vicious circle of corruption-poverty-crime. 
Homophily also explains why nuclear smugglers operating from and through Transnistria 
show such an inclination to deal with arms traffickers, insurgent groups and states bent on 
acquiring nuclear weapons. But these ties took a decade to fully develop and bear fruit. In the 
1990s, amateurism characterized nuclear traffickers’ attempts to sell fissile materials or 
radioactive sources to terrorist groups. Identifying interested buyers represented a 
considerable challenge, as smuggling groups had not yet built sufficient connections to the 
pool of effective or potential proliferators. Occasionally, traffickers adopted a “travelling 
sales representative” approach, knocking on doors in pursuit of a buyer. This strategy made 
them vulnerable to detection and resulted in their capture and imprisonment. For example, in 
May 1999 a Turkish citizen with residence in Tiraspol smuggled a vial of highly enriched 
uranium (HEU) through Transnistria, the Republic of Moldova, Romania, and Bulgaria, and 
back. He carried the fissile nuclear material in his car to Istanbul where he hoped to meet 
with the representatives of a militant group or of a Middle Eastern government. As the 
potential buyers did not show up, he went back through Bulgaria, in an attempt to find a 
                                                          
37 Silvia von Steinsdorff and Anna Fruhstorfer, “Post-Soviet de facto states in search of internal and external 
legitimacy. Introduction,” Communist and Post-Communist Studies, Vol. 45, No. 1-2 (March-June 2012), 118. 
38 Nikolay Petrov, “Vlasti kriminala i kriminal vlasti,” Novaya Gazeta, No. 64, November 16, 2000, available at: 
http://2000.novayagazeta.ru/nomer/2000/64n/n64n-s18.shtml; Janusz Bugajski, Cold Peace: Russia’s New 
Imperialism (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2004), 107. 
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buyer in Romania.39 He escaped detection the first time, but on his way back from Turkey, 
his nervousness gave him away. Alarmed by his suspicious behavior, the Bulgarian border 
guards performed a routine control and discovered the HEU vial in the trunk of his car. The 
forensics report indicated that the HEU originated in the Mayak Production Association in 
Russia. The sloppiness of this attempted trafficking operation explains why the smuggler got 
caught and convicted. 
Over the span of a decade, nuclear traffickers changed their tactics along two lines. First, they 
started recruiting experienced smugglers who knew the routes, chokepoints, and police 
standard operating procedures. Second, instead of travelling long distances in search of 
buyers, smugglers preferred to stay put and coordinate transactions from safe locations inside 
breakaway republics. 
With respect to the new recruitment policy adopted by trafficking groups, the lenient penal 
codes and the corrupt law enforcement systems of countries in Eastern Europe foster 
recidivism. Convicted traffickers execute their sentences, which rarely exceed a year, and 
then move to another country to resume their criminal activities. Transnational criminal 
organizations regard them as valuable assets, thanks to the social capital they accumulate in 
prison (the connections to other interlopers and even to law enforcement circles) and to their 
technical comparative advantage (they know the strengths and weaknesses of nuclear 
facilities). For example, the nuclear trafficking group formed around an unidentified 
Transnistrian resident and six Moldovans (among them Ion Toporaș, Sergiu Sajin, and 
Constantin Savițchi) included three former convicts, who had served sentences in Romania 
and the Russian Federation, and two former policemen. In August 2010, through a sting 
operation that lasted more than a month, the Moldovan police caught the Moldovan members 
of the group in an attempt to sell 1.8 kg of U238 (depleted uranium) on the black market for 
$11 million. The culprits cut a small piece of an industrial container for gamma radiography 
made of U238 and tried to sell it to a policeman pretending to be a buyer. After interrogating 
the culprits, the police found the remaining piece in a garage, which was partially 
contaminated. The authorities relied on their international partners (mainly the FBI) to 
determine the origin of the material. It is believed the depleted uranium may have come from 
the Russian Federation, with the PMR functioning as a transit route.40 
Yet, Transnistria amounts to more than a corridor for moving nuclear materials; it is also a 
choke point for law enforcement. Its police force does not share its records with international 
law enforcement agencies, because the Republic of Moldova cannot allow the PMR to 
become a member of Europol or Interpol, lest it amount to international recognition. Being 
cut off from the international community basically ensures that the identity of the 
Transnistrian resident involved in this failed smuggling attempt remains unknown. Equipped 
with either a Moldovan or Russian passport (or both), the fugitive can roam free and form a 
                                                          
39 Lyudmila Zaitseva, “Nuclear Trafficking in Ungoverned Spaces and Failed States,” in Anne L. Clunan and 
Harold A. Trinkunas (eds.), Ungoverned Spaces. Alternatives to State Authority in an Era of Softened 
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40 Contrabandă cu Uraniu 238, Gardianul, September 2, 2010, available at http://gardianul.md/?p=622. 
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new smuggling network in the future. The anonymity that separatist regions offer, knowingly 
or not, increases the chances that smuggling groups survive and continue their activities. 
If in the 2010 example the special status of the separatist region of Transnistria allowed a 
member of the smuggling group to vanish into thin air, another incident one year later shows 
how traffickers use PMR territory to run smuggling networks under the nose of the 
Transnistrian authorities. Some ringleaders even coordinate transnational operations from the 
comfort of their homes. For example, a trafficking group that attempted to sell U235 in 2011 
received its orders from its leader, Aleksandr Ageenko, over the phone and via Skype. While 
he remained in Tiraspol, safe from prosecution, his associates (his wife, Galina, and the 
Moldovan citizens Teodor Chetruș, Ruslan Andropov, Gheorge Tăut, and Eduard Bostan) 
operated in Chișinău. The Moldovan security forces unsuccessfully tried to lure Ageenko out 
of Tiraspol by posing as the representatives of a militant group from North Africa requesting 
a meeting in Chișinău. Ageenko did not take the bait, and relied on his partners to carry out 
the operation on the ground. The group attempted to sell a vial containing 6-7 grams of U235 
(HEU) to the fake North African terrorist group for $410,000. The Transnistrian ringleader 
claimed he could deliver 1 kg of HEU, for $41 million.41 The 6-gram HEU vial represented a 
sample, with the rest scheduled to be delivered if the purchaser was satisfied with the quality 
of the material in question. The forensic analysis carried out by the FBI indicated that the 
material came from the Russian Federation, through Transnistria.42 Following a sting 
operation in June 2011, all the members of the group, except Aleksandr Ageenko, were 
arrested and are currently serving time in prison.43 Since the Moldovan police does not have 
jurisdiction in Transnistria, Ageenko is still free. Intentionally or not, the PMR shields 
smuggling groups from indictment and imprisonment. 
Separatist regions cannot offer the same diplomatic privileges that states enjoy. For instance, 
a trafficking network operating from Transnistria does not benefit from the diplomatic 
immunity and communications security that Pakistan provided to the A. Q. Khan network.44 
However, the international community can put pressure on a state like Pakistan by 
threatening exclusion from various multilateral fora or by instituting sanctions (restricting 
development aid or commercial ties). Separatist regions like Transnistria remain impervious 
to such threats because of their limited participation in international organizations and trade. 
Extradition of criminals operating in these breakaway republics rarely happens, as the 
separatists feel they have nothing to lose if they provoke the ire of the international 
community. 
What makes separatist regions truly irresistible for nuclear smugglers is the presence of 
transnational criminal organizations involved in drug, sex, and arms trafficking. Joining 
forces with TCOs adds another layer of sophistication to nuclear smuggling operations, 
                                                          
41 General Prosecutor’s Office of the Republic of Moldova, Agheenko Group Investigation File. 
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making their detection, disruption, and dismantlement a difficult task. The TCOs dominating 
this space are run by ‘vory v zakonye’ (‘thieves in law’, that is, well-established criminals 
with great authority in the criminal world, who play by the criminal world’s rules) and 
structured on the Soviet (and post-Soviet) model of a ‘bratva’ (brotherhood). These 
organizations have spread to neighboring countries and regions, weakening state capacity. 
Criminals connected to Transnistria, for example, infiltrated Moldova and Romania. From 
1993 until 2001, circa 115 criminal organizations employing 1150 people divided the 
territory of the Republic of Moldova among themselves, running parallel to the state 
authorities. Some of the most famous criminal groups in this part of the world include those 
centered around such individuals as Grigore Caramalac (also known as Bulgaru, who has 
been on Interpol’s most wanted list since 1998 for his extensive contacts with Solntsevskaya 
Bratva dating back to the 1980s);45 Alexandru Sinegur (also known as Sinigur; connected to 
the Ukrainian mafia boss Vasyl Maryanchuk);46 Movsar Ibraghimov (also known as Mavsar; 
the son of a Chechen leader);47 Malhaz Djaparidze (also known as Malhaz; a Georgian 
citizen involved in trafficking drugs and weapons);48 Vladimir Moscalciuk (also known as 
Makena; a Ukrainian citizen involved in thefts, robberies, cars trafficking and alcohol 
smuggling);49 Valeri Rotari (also known as Zelioniy, the father-in-law of Movsar 
Ibraghimov); and Ivan Gușan (also known as Patron, whose racket, involved in extortion, 
drug trafficking, and assassinations, had its headquarters in Sibiu, Romania).50 The 
debilitating effect these criminal organizations have on local state authority prepares the 
ground for larger, more powerful networks, which are attracted by the relatively easy access 
to weapons. 
Moldova, Transnistria, and Romania are well known internationally for being both countries 
of origin as well as transit points for weapons smuggled into Africa and the Middle East. At 
the center of Moldova’s and Transnistria’s illicit arms trade sat Viktor Bout, the world’s most 
notorious gunrunner, also known as the “Merchant of Death.” Bout’s fortune, by some 
accounts in excess of $6 billion, derived primarily from the illegal trade with small arms, 
ammunitions, and advanced conventional weapons, although by some accounts, his 
operations also included shipping everything from raw minerals to gladiolas, drilling 
equipment to frozen fish.51 Bout smuggled weapons from Ukraine through Transnistria and 
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Moldova into the Middle East and Africa.52 Between 2001 and 2004, Aerocom, a Chișinău-
based carrier with connections to Bout, delivered weapons manufactured in the Republic of 
Moldova to various countries under UN embargo.53 In 2003, Aerocom supplied Charles 
Taylor, the then ruler of Liberia, with tons of small arms and ammunitions.54 The company’s 
air operating certificate was revoked in August 2004, but Aerocom continued to operate, 
delivering ammunition and military equipment to Iraq.55 
The United States captured Bout in a Drug Enforcement Administration sting operation, and 
convicted him to 25 years in prison, despite Moscow’s opposition.56 Since the Russian 
trafficker covered his tracks exceptionally well, thanks to all the front companies he 
established and his foreign contacts, the United States could not charge him with more than 
the intent to sell man-portable air-defense systems to the Colombian guerrilla group FARC 
and to kill American citizens.57 Bout himself stayed away from smuggling nuclear materials, 
but the bridges he built to various countries and non-state actors through illicit arms sales 
helped his regional and international associates expand their operations to include nuclear 
trafficking. 
The transnational criminal group run by Shimon Naor, Ivan (Ion) Busuioc, and Ion Menciu 
offers a good example in this respect. Naor, an Israeli-Romanian citizen who had retired as 
lieutenant-colonel from the Israeli Navy, partnered up with Bout in the late 1990s to sell anti-
aircraft weapons and ammunition manufactured in Romania to embargoed African 
countries.58 Busuioc, a Moldovan-Romanian citizen who had retired from the Russian Main 
Intelligence Directorate – GRU, functioned as a liaison between Bout and Naor, and 
facilitated their access to weapons storage sites in Russia, Ukraine, and the Republic of 
Moldova.59 Ion Menciu set up the infrastructure for the Bout-Naor joint operations from his 
position as the general director of Acvila Air, a registered Romanian carrier. The Romanian 
authorities captured Naor in 1999, but he escaped to Israel by bribing several magistrates 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamerica/8865754/Merchant-of-Death-Viktor-Bout-found-
guilty-of-conspiring-to-sell-missiles-to-terrorists.html; Douglas Farah and Stephen Braun, Who is Viktor Bout?, 
available at: http://merchantofdeaththebook.com/about-viktor-bout/. 
52 Stephen Braun and Douglas Farah, Merchant of Death: Money, Guns, Planes and the Man Who Makes War 
Possible (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 2007), 253; Andrew Feinstein, The Shadow World: Inside the Global 
Arms Trade (London: Penguin, 2011), 464; Peter Landesman, “Arms and the Man,” New York Times, August 
17, 2003, available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2003/08/17/magazine/arms-and-the-
man.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm. 
53 Douglas Farah, To Viktor Go the Spoils. War and Terror Inc., The Washington Post, September 23, 2007, 
available at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/09/21/AR2007092101544.html. 
54 Report of the Panel of Experts concerning Liberia (S/2003/937), 29, available at 
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2003/937. 
55 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Aerocom Case Study, available at: 
http://www.sipri.org/research/security/transport/airtransport/eu/case_studies. 
56 Lavrov: Arest Buta i Yaroshenko – primer amerikanskoy “isklyuchitel’nosti”, RIA Novosti, October 8, 2013, 
available at: http://ria.ru/world/20131008/968636326.html. 
57 Owen Matthews, “Viktor Bout’s Secrets Frighten the Kremlin,” Newsweek, September 2, 2010, available at: 
http://www.newsweek.com/viktor-bouts-secrets-frighten-kremlin-72249. 
58 Bout, afaceri cu arme împreună cu Shimon Naor, Romania Liberă, March 12, 2008, available at: 
http://www.romanialibera.ro/actualitate/eveniment/bout--afaceri-cu-arme-impreuna-cu-shimon-naor-119907. 
59 Mihai Munteanu, “Rețeaua IUDA: Spionii lui Ivan,” Evenimentul Zilei, June 23, 2008. 
Partenerul de afaceri al lui Shimon Naor, spion rus, Hotnews, August 27, 2007, available at: 
http://www.hotnews.ro/stiri-arhiva-1036096-partenerul-afaceri-lui-shimon-naor-spion-rus.htm. 
18 
 
ruling on his case. His network continued its illicit activities in Romania, getting involved in 
nuclear trafficking.60 Naor coordinated these operations from Israel until 2010, when Interpol 
seized him in Paris and brought him back to Romania. His partner, Ivan Busuioc, was 
arrested in 2007 on charges related to trafficking arms, explosives, and nuclear materials. 
Despite ultimately being captured, Bout and Naor appear to have created a sophisticated 
trafficking network, based on mutual advantage. On the one hand, the connection to the 
Romanian aircraft industry reportedly helped Viktor Bout create front companies in Romania 
- such as Flying Dolphin Company - and purchase Romanian planes for his weapons 
smuggling operations.61 On the other hand, Naor’s group capitalized on Bout’s connections 
to the weapons black market to accumulate capital which Naor then used to bribe judges and 
escape prison. 
The complicated story involving Viktor Bout and his associates underlines the importance of 
separatist regions for smuggling networks. While it is true that, unlike some of the traffickers 
discussed above, Bout did not use Transnistria as his headquarters he nonetheless relied on it 
as a stepping stone to Moldova and Romania. One of the biggest problems Chișinău 
confronts is the lack of administrative control over the borders of Transnistria. A person may 
cross the border into the PMR (legally or illegally), enter Moldova without any checks, and 
then leave the country through Transnistria, without ever being registered or checked by the 
Moldovan authorities. A 411 km-long administrative border separates the Republic of 
Moldova from Transnistria, leaving more than a quarter of Moldova’s borders practically 
open. Tiraspol runs its own customs service, which is world-famous for its venality. 
Generous bribes can make Transnistrian border guards and customs officials turn a blind eye 
to large-scale contraband of the sort Bout engaged in. 
The complexity that the smuggling networks derive from the combination of quasi-state 
support, organized crime, gunrunning, and access to radiological and nuclear materials is 
evidenced in Semyon Mogilevich’s activities. Known as “the brainy don,” Mogilevich works 
closely with the Solntsevskaya Bratva crime group, one of Russia’s most powerful mafias. 
An Israeli businessman of Ukrainian origin, he stands as one of FBI’s top ten most wanted 
men, given his involvement in arms, sex, and drug trafficking and his connections to Al-
Qaeda and FARC. In 2001, Osama bin Laden reportedly asked Mogilevich for help with 
obtaining a nuclear weapon or enough nuclear materials to build a dirty bomb.62 The outcome 
of this request remains unclear, although some experts claim the Ukrainian mobster provided 
Al-Qaeda with HEU.63 Seven years later, Mogilevich reportedly met with a high-ranking 
FARC member in Bucharest for the sale of nuclear materials, but the transaction did not 
materialize.64 Despite these failures, Mogilevich’s networks present the literature on 
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proliferation with an interesting example of trafficking sophistication. These terrorist 
organizations turned to “the brainy don” for help with building a RDD because he was known 
to have easy access to sensitive materials. Mogilevich became involved in the privatization of 
various industrial complexes in Transnistria, including the Metallurgical Plant in Rîbnița 
which contained unsecured radioactive sources.65 Although Mogilevich does not specialize in 
transferring know-how à la A. Q. Khan, his ability to supply RN materials located on his 
premises via routes that he built through weapons trafficking piqued FARC’s interest. This 
combination of roles shortened and simplified logistics, preventing the Moldovan authorities 
from intercepting the RN materials and disrupting such operations. The bulk of the illicit 
trade carried out by Mogilevich’s network remained in the area of ‘traditional’ contraband - 
weapons, narcotics, and sex, with incidents of nuclear smuggling being extremely rare. This 
particular mix of conventional and unconventional trafficking sets Mogilevich’s group apart 
from other proliferation rings. His success depends in large part to Transnistria’s support. 
Owing to the lack of administrative control by the Chișinău authorities over the Transnistrian 
breakaway republic, there is no hard data on how many radioactive sources are currently 
located in Transnistria. It is believed that Transnistria does not have the necessary physical 
protection and detection equipment to secure these sources on its territory. The lack of 
preparedness and the abandonment of sensitive industrial facilities by bankrupt breakaway 
republics allow TCOs to gain access to RN materials, which they then try to sell to terrorist 
groups. 
Countersmuggling Assistance 
The weight of countersmuggling efforts to address the nexus of organized crime, weapons 
trafficking, and nuclear materials in Transnistria falls on the Republic of Moldova. As 
Chișinău’s financial resources are already spread thin, Moldova receives all of the technology 
and training for using RN detection devices from abroad. During the Cold War, Soviet 
experts trained the Moldovan authorities on how to operate the detection equipment provided 
by the USSR. Over the past twenty-five years, the situation has changed dramatically, with 
the United States replacing Russia as Moldova’s main partner. This shift has left Moscow 
dissatisfied, primarily because the assistance programs detailed in Table 1 involve a 
significant military and intelligence component. From Russia’s perspective, the operations 
run by the U.S. military and civilian agencies in Moldova, Romania, and, increasingly, in 
Ukraine as part of these assistance programs, take place on its very doorstep. 
Countersmuggling efforts come primarily in bilateral form; on the rare occasion that 
operations take a multilateral character, U.S. agencies rarely invite Russia.66 To counter what 
it sees as American provocation, the Kremlin has intensified its efforts to assert Russian 
influence in its near abroad. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Liderul FARC, Raul Reyes, a încercat să cumpere uraniu la București, România Liberă, March 11, 2008, 
available at: http://www.romanialibera.ro/actualitate/eveniment/liderul-farc-raul-reyes-a-incercat-sa-cumpere-
uraniu-la-bucuresti-119792.html. 
65 Head of Russian Mafia Arrested in Moscow, Journalistic Investigations Center, July 2, 2008, available at: 
http://www.investigatii.md/eng/index.php?art=156&cat=5&editie=. 
66 Interview with Dr. Eng. Lucian Biro, former President of National Commission for Nuclear Activities Control 
(CNCAN), Bucharest, Romania, February 6, 2013; Interview with CNCAN Official, Bucharest, Romania, 
February 4, 2013; Interview with Răzvan Budeanu, Border Police Commissioner, Bucharest, Romania, February 
8, 2013. 
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Table 1: Countersmuggling Initiatives developed by the United States in Moldova and 
Romania 
 SPONSORS DOE & 
NNSA 
DOS DOS DOS DOD & DTRA 
MOLDOVA 
 
 
 
 
 Second 
Line of 
Defense 
Core 
Program 
Export 
Control 
and 
Related 
Border 
Security 
Program 
Nuclear 
Smuggling 
Outreach 
Initiative 
Preventing 
Nuclear 
Smuggling 
Program 
International 
Counterprolifera
tion Program 
Beneficiaries Moldovan Customs Service; the Civil Protection and Emergency 
Situations Service; the 5101 and 5102 Special Depositories; and 
the National Agency for the Regulation of Nuclear and 
Radiological Activities (ANRANR) 
Equipment Natrii-Iod detectors; PACKEYE backpacks; portable detectors; 
InSpector1000 detectors; Radiogem detectors 
Training  Investigation techniques for radiation detection; operating 
dosimeters; performing radiological checks; forensics; securing 
radioactive sources; radiological protection 
ROMANIA  Second 
Line of 
Defense 
Core 
Program 
Export 
Control 
and 
Related 
Border 
Security 
Program 
 Global 
Initiative 
to Combat 
Nuclear 
Terrorism 
International 
Counterprolifera
tion Program 
Beneficiaries National Customs Authority; Border Police; the National 
Commission for Nuclear Activities Control in Romania  
Equipment 90 detectors; two vans equipped with radiation detection 
equipment 
Training Investigation techniques for radiation detection; operating 
dosimeters; performing radiological checks; forensics; securing 
radioactive sources; radiological protection 
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A close examination of the detection infrastructure in the Republic of Moldova reveals the 
presence of several vulnerabilities and gaps (see Table 2).67 One of Chișinău’s biggest 
problems is the lack of a complete inventory of the radioactive sources provided by the 
Soviet Union during the communist era for research, agricultural, and industrial facilities.68 
There are no nuclear power reactors in the Republic of Moldova. However, Moldova has 345 
industrial, agricultural, research, or medical facilities that use radioactive sources. The most 
important ones, such as the Chemistry Institute, the Diagnostic Center, the Oncology 
Institute, the Plant Genetics and Physiology Institute, the Physics Institute, and the 
Agriculture Ministry Institute, are operated by the state.69 The majority of privately-operated 
radioactive sources can be found in dental clinics. Out of the 345 radioactive sources in 
Moldova, two are Category 1 sources, and fifty are Category 2 sources.70 First and second 
category radioactive sources are protected by at least 3 levels of security, including CCTV 
and armed guards, while third category sources are protected by alarm systems connected to 
the police forces, which can intervene in five minutes.71 The DOE has contributed greatly to 
the security of these facilities by paying for the armed guards. In addition, the 5101 and 5102 
Special Depositories store the radioactive waste produced by these industrial facilities.72 
Countersmuggling operations must monitor transportation routes as well as the facilities 
storing RN materials. Because the Republic of Moldova has only partial control of its own 
border, in November 2005, the European Commission set up the European Union Border 
Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine with a view to enhancing the border 
management capacities of the Moldovan and Ukrainian authorities (including the border 
police and customs authorities). EUBAM itself does not carry out any checks on vehicles or 
pedestrians, but rather supports Moldova and Ukraine with operational advice, capacity-
building through training, and monitoring.73 EUBAM extends this assistance to the 454 km-
long part of the Moldovan-Ukrainian border which is under the administrative control of the 
Transnistrian authorities. 
                                                          
67 Dmitrii Romanovskii, “Pochemu Moldova stala kanalom dlya yadernoi kontrabandy,” Moldavskye Vedemosti, 
November 7, 2012, available at: 
http://www.vedomosti.md/news/Pochemu_Moldova_Stala_Kanalom_Dlya_Yadernoi_Kontrabandy. 
68 Interview with Artur Buzdugan, Director of the National Agency for the Regulation of Nuclear and 
Radiological Activities, Chișinău, Republic of Moldova, February 19, 2013. 
69 Idem; Interview with ANRANR Official, Chișinău, Republic of Moldova, February 20, 2013. 
70 According to the Environmental Protection Agency, Category 1 sources can “lead to the death or permanent 
injury of individuals who are in close proximity to the source for a short period of time (minutes to hours).” 
Category 1 sources are used in radioisotope thermoelectric generators, irradiators, teletherapy machines, and 
fixed multi-beam teletherapy machines. Category 2 sources can “lead to the death or permanent injury of 
individuals who are in close proximity to the source for a longer period of time than for Category 1 sources.” 
Category 2 sources are used in industrial gamma radiography equipment and high/medium dose-rate 
brachytherapy. Environmental Protection Agency, Sealed Radioactive Sources, available at: 
http://www.epa.gov/radiation/source-reduction-management/sources.html. 
71 Interview with Artur Buzdugan, ANRANR Director, Chișinău, Republic of Moldova, February 19, 2013. 
72 Interview with Artur Buzdugan, ANRANR Director, Chișinău, Republic of Moldova, February 19, 2013; 
Interview with ANRANR Official, Chișinău, Republic of Moldova, February 20, 2013. 
73 Interview with EUBAM Official, Chișinău, Republic of Moldova, February 20, 2013. 
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Incidents involving RN materials (orphan or lost radioactive sources) are reported to 
ANRANR.74 In case of an attempt to smuggle RN materials in/from/through Moldovan 
territory, the Border Police officers or Customs Service officers alert by phone the ANRANR 
officials. ANRANR is equipped with a RN detection van, which can establish the type of RN 
material and the radiation dose. Removal and storage is undertaken by the Civilian Protection 
and Emergency Situations Service.75 The specialized laboratories of the Public Health 
Ministry, the Agriculture Ministry, and the Environment Ministry can carry out additional 
tests, but because there is no centralized database with all the radioactive sources in the 
Republic of Moldova, they cannot establish the origin of the source, and the enrichment 
percentage. The Republic of Moldova does not possess nuclear forensics and attribution 
facilities. In case of an attempt to smuggle RN materials in/from/through the Republic of 
Moldova, the Moldovan authorities can obtain such services from one of the international 
laboratories specialized in nuclear forensics, such as the Seibersdorf Laboratories operated by 
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the Institute for Transuranium Elements in 
Karlsruhe, and the Kyiv Institute for Nuclear Research.76 
 
GOVERNMENTAL 
AGENCY 
BORDER POLICE CUSTOMS SERVICE 
BORDER POINT   
 
CHISINAU 
INTERNATIONAL 
AIRPORT 
 
Three Radiation Pager-S 
portable detectors 
 
Two IdentiFINDER portable 
detectors 
Two fixed RN detection portals 
GIURGIULESTI 
(RAIL) 
Two Radiation Pager-S portable 
detectors 
 
GIURGIULESTI 
(PORT) 
Two Radiation Pager-S portable 
detectors 
 
GIURGIULESTI  
(LAND) 
 Fixed RN detection portal 
UNGHENI  
(RAIL) 
Four Radiation Pager-S portable 
detectors 
 
OTACI 
(RAIL)  
Two Radiation Pager-S portable 
detectors 
 
OCNITA 
(RAIL) 
Two Radiation Pager-S portable 
detectors 
 
LIPCANI 
(LAND) 
 Fixed RN detection portal 
SCULENI 
(LAND) 
 Fixed RN detection portal 
TUDORA 
(LAND) 
 Fixed RN detection portal 
CRIVA  Fixed RN detection portal 
                                                          
74 Interview with ANRANR Official, Chișinău, Republic of Moldova, February 20, 2013. 
75 Interview with Alexandru Oprea, Head of the Civilian Protection and Emergency Situations Service, 
Chișinău, Republic of Moldova, February 27, 2013. 
76 Interview with Artur Buzdugan, ANRANR Director, Chișinău, Republic of Moldova, February 19, 2013. 
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(LAND) 
 
The assistance Chișinău has received in the field of nuclear detection and counter-smuggling 
allows Moldova to take the initiative in its dealings with Transnistria. Among their most 
important recent achievements, the authorities in Chișinău note several efforts undertaken in 
cooperation with Tiraspol on matters related to radiological protection and border security. A 
major success with regards to the safety of radioactive sources in Transnistria was the 
adoption of a protocol decision by Tiraspol and Chișinău on the procedure for transporting 
and storing radioactive materials located in Transnistria. In this respect, on February 8, 2013, 
the Moldovan authorities carried out an inspection in Transnistria at the Metallurgical Plant 
in Rîbnița. On this occasion, they checked the levels of radioactivity at the Metallurgical 
Plant, which between 2000 and 2004 had been contaminated by RN sources.77 On the 
occasion of this inspection, the Moldovan authorities managed to collect information about 
the Metallurgical Plant which was previously unavailable and to register all the remaining 
sources at this facility into the Moldovan state database. The supervision of radioactive 
activities at the Metallurgical Plant in Rîbnița is now the responsibility of the Moldovan 
authorities.78 
Regarding border controls, in 2005 the Republic of Moldova reached an agreement with 
Ukraine allowing Transnistrian businesses to export goods through Ukraine as long as they 
are registered with the Moldovan authorities. However, as Transnistrian companies lack 
economic competitiveness, Tiraspol continues to heavily rely on contraband and has few 
incentives to cooperate. Registering Transnistrian firms in Moldova deprives Tiraspol of 
significant revenues from taxes and bribes. Moreover, as most of these Transnistrian 
companies are state-run, having them report to the Moldovan authorities undermines 
Tiraspol’s claims to independence. Protecting its own system, because of the dearth of 
alternative sources of income, represents Tiraspol’s ultimate goal. The Chișinău-Tiraspol 
dynamics exemplify the typical situation in which the principal (Moldova) plans, but the 
agent (Transnistria) does not perform. 
Conclusion and Policy Implications 
The state of autarky that Transnistria seems to enjoy brings to the fore the question of 
Russia’s influence. The PMR justified its secession on humanitarian grounds, invoking the 
need to protect the Russian-speaking population from Moldova’s nationalist policies.79 
Moscow has been instrumental for the survival of this quasi-state, not only by maintaining a 
military presence on its territory and granting the local population Russian passports, but also 
by trading with Transnistria.80 At the beginning of the crisis in Eastern Ukraine, Moscow 
boosted its commercial ties with Tiraspol, and carried out military exercises in the breakaway 
                                                          
77 Interview with ANRANR Official, Chișinău, Republic of Moldova, February 20, 2013. 
78 Idem. 
79 Natalya O. Kharitonova, “Pridnestrovye: Voyna i peremirye (1990-1992 gg.),” Novyi istoricheskiy vestnik, 
Vol. 17 (2008), 188-190. 
80 Idem, “Sotsial’no-ekonomicheskoye razvitiye Pridnestrovskoy Moldavskoy Respubliki: problem i 
perspektivy (1990-2012 gody),” Gosudarstvennoye upravleniye, Vol. 41 (December 2013), 128. 
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republic.81 In March 2014, the Kremlin conducted an anti-terrorism drill and operations 
meant to repel an attack on the Russian military base in the PMR.82 Most important, the 
Transnistrian authorities have requested admission into the Russian Federation, although the 
PMR does not share a border with it. But more recently, Moscow has tapered off its financial 
assistance for Transnistria, most probably because of Russia’s own economic woes.83 
In the context of anti-Kyiv protests erupting in the Ukrainian port of Odessa in May 2014, 
experts have started to fear a scenario where Moscow foments unrest in Ukraine to create a 
pro-Russian strip of land, running from Donbass in the East, to Crimea in the South, and 
Transnistria in the West.84 Recent commentary about Transnistria being the next flashpoint 
seems to corroborate these concerns.85 The emergence of an enlarged Novorossiya would be 
a boon for smuggling networks. Not only would such a quasi-state be close to important 
nuclear facilities, but it would also grant TCOs accessible trafficking routes. The largest 
nuclear power plant in Europe, Zaporizhia Nuclear Power Plant, is located 200 km away from 
the areas where fighting is currently taking place in Eastern Ukraine. Fearing a takeover of 
the power plant by proponents of federalism, in May 2014, members of the Fascist group 
Pravy Sektor sought to gain access to the power plant, but were repelled by the police before 
entering the town of Enerhodar.86 Despite being a total failure, Pravy Sektor’s attempt shows 
how Ukraine’s governmental institutions and agencies come under attack not only from pro-
Russian forces, but also from the far right. 
According to Montgomery, there are four policy options for fighting proliferation networks: 
global controls, regime change, isolation, and incentives. This paper argues in favor of a 
combination of global controls and incentives, to be applied to separatist regions, the 
countries they try to separate from, and their sponsors. Regarding the internal configuration 
of breakaway states, it is critical to bolster law enforcement capabilities. Police forces, 
through their oversight and knowledge about local communities, seem better able to stem 
nuclear trafficking and prevent its re-occurrence than the use of military force or covert 
operations. Regarding external factors, specialized agencies, such as the IAEA, could begin 
by sending regular fact-finding and assistance missions to separatist regions, to help locate, 
secure, and remove radioactive materials. Granting breakaway republics observer-status 
                                                          
81 Russia defies Moldova’s EU pact by boosting Transnistria trade, EurActiv, July 3, 2014, available at: 
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Near Ukraine’s Western Border, Escalating Tensions,” International Business Times, March 26, 2014, available 
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83 Victoria Puiu, “Russia's rouble crisis threatens support for rebel republic Transnistria,” The Guardian, 
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85 Zakrytoye okno v Evropu, Izvestia, June 1, 2015, available at: http://izvestia.ru/news/587251. 
86 Error! Main Document Only.Neo-Nazi “Right Sector” attempts to seize largest Nuclear Power Plant in 
Ukraine, Nuclear News, May 17, 2014, available at: http://nuclear-news.net/2014/05/18/ukraine-crisis-goes-
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within such international organizations would introduce them to the international nuclear 
nonproliferation regime, and render them aware of the dangers posed by nuclear trafficking. 
Yet, the IAEA cannot invite separatists to take part in its activities without causing an uproar 
in Moldova or Ukraine. The IAEA must persuade the leadership in Chișinău and Kyiv that 
nuclear smuggling can harm them more than readjusting the frontier line. To drive home this 
idea, the IAEA might look for support in Brussels. Ukraine’s and Moldova’s sustained efforts 
to draw closer to the West gives the EU and NATO a certain degree of leverage vis-à-vis the 
resolution of frozen conflicts in the region. Both organizations need to apply a carrot-and-
stick policy to help Moldova and Ukraine reach a political solution to the frozen conflicts on 
their Eastern borders. Economic assistance could induce Chișinău and Kyiv to cooperate with 
the separatists. Profits from legal business might dissuade the local populations from 
engaging in contraband activities, but the positive effects of economic integration into global 
commercial exchanges will more likely trickle in rather than gush out. NATO could direct 
more resources towards helping these countries deal with nuclear trafficking networks 
through its SPS program. Stepping up assistance for Ukraine and Moldova does not have to 
come at Russia’s expense, however. 
Moscow sees the intensification of U.S. efforts to curb nuclear trafficking through 
Transnistria, Moldova, Ukraine, and Romania as evidence that Washington is preparing to 
enforce regime change in territories it considers hostile. While this perception may be far 
from American intentions, the 2014 events in Ukraine, which saw Viktor Yanukovich 
replaced with Petro Poroshenko, did not help convince the Russians otherwise. Granting 
separatist republics a modest form of recognition such as observer-status at the IAEA could 
assuage the Kremlin, and even win its support in addressing the threat posed by nuclear 
trafficking. Moscow’s clout in these separatist regions makes it an indispensable partner for 
the West on matters related to countersmuggling. The West must cooperate with Russia in 
areas of common interest, such as nuclear proliferation, and recognize the Kremlin’s security, 
economic, and diplomatic concerns as legitimate. Through the prism of the current crisis in 
Eastern Ukraine, a partnership with Russia may seem an elusive goal. Yet, if offered the right 
incentives, Russia can apply pressure on these separatist regions to crack down on organized 
crime, reduce their reliance on illicit trade, and enhance security at weapons storage sites and 
radiological and nuclear facilities. The networks operating in this region cannot be taken out 
in one go. Complex operations carried out with FBI and DOD support only scratch the 
surface. The process of dismantling illicit networks in this region must address chronic 
weaknesses in these societies: corruption, lack of transparency, poverty, and ethnic divisions, 
occasionally fuelled by the state. 
